generated from john/python-template
ver1 - Step 5 implementation plan
This commit is contained in:
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# Ver1 Step 5 Results: Private-Network Safety Baseline
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## Summary
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Step 5 implementation status: **in progress**.
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This document records completed private-network safety controls, validation evidence, and residual risks for Ver1 Step 5.
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Implemented in this step:
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1. _TBD_
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2. _TBD_
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3. _TBD_
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---
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## Implemented Changes
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### 1) Security assumptions and threat model
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_TBD_
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### 2) Single-operator access control baseline
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_TBD_
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### 3) Input validation and safe-output hardening
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_TBD_
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### 4) Secret handling and configuration safety
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_TBD_
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### 5) Dependency/security scanning baseline
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_TBD_
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---
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## Test and Verification Evidence
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### Added/Updated Tests
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1. _TBD_
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2. _TBD_
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3. _TBD_
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### Validation Runs
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Run and record outcomes:
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- `uv run pytest --collect-only -q` -> _TBD_
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- `uv run pytest -m unit -q` -> _TBD_
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- `uv run pytest -m "not external" -q` -> _TBD_
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- `uv run pytest -q` -> _TBD_
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### Security Scan Evidence
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Record scan commands and outcomes:
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- dependency scan command(s): _TBD_
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- static/security lint command(s): _TBD_
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- critical/high findings: _TBD_
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- remediation/defer decisions: _TBD_
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---
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## Requirement Traceability (Step 5)
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| Step 5 Area | REQ Coverage | Status | Evidence |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Private-network and single-operator safety posture | REQ-9 | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
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| Access control behavior at UI/API boundaries | REQ-5, REQ-7 | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
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| Input validation and safe user-facing error behavior | REQ-1, REQ-2, REQ-5 | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
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| Config and startup safety controls | REQ-8, REQ-10 | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
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| Persistence and domain integrity continuity | REQ-11, REQ-12 | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
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---
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## Operational Artifacts Produced
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- `docs/ver1/ver1-step5.md`
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- `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-results.md`
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- _TBD additional artifacts_
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---
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## Risks, Exceptions, and Follow-Ups
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1. _TBD_
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2. _TBD_
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3. _TBD_
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Open follow-ups to carry forward:
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- _TBD_
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---
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## Step 5 Exit Assessment
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- Private-network assumptions and controls: **_TBD_**
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- Access-control baseline effectiveness: **_TBD_**
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- Validation and safe-output safety: **_TBD_**
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- Secret handling and config safety: **_TBD_**
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- Dependency/security risk closure: **_TBD_**
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- Test and regression safety: **_TBD_**
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Step 5 completion status: **_TBD_**
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---
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## Handoff to Step 6
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Once Step 5 is marked complete, Step 6 can proceed with:
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- clearer operational security assumptions for logs/runbooks
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- hardened boundary behavior for diagnosis and support
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- reduced risk posture for personal-scale ongoing operations
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# Step 5 Implementation Plan: Private-Network Safety Baseline
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## Purpose
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Implement **Ver1 Step 5** from `docs/ver1/ver1.md` by applying right-sized security controls for a single-user system running on a trusted private network.
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Step 5 focuses on practical risk reduction without introducing unnecessary complexity, while preserving:
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- personal-scale operational simplicity
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- single-operator workflow
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- explicit boundary ownership from `docs/architecture.md`
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- safety and diagnostics behavior defined in `docs/error_handling.md`
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Primary governing docs:
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- `docs/ver1/ver1.md` (Step 5 objective and sequencing)
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- `docs/architecture.md` (deployment model and module boundaries)
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- `docs/error_handling.md` (safe user output and diagnostic boundaries)
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- `docs/requirements.md` (REQ-1, REQ-2, REQ-5, REQ-7, REQ-8, REQ-9, REQ-10, REQ-11, REQ-12)
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- `docs/intent.md` (domain integrity priorities)
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---
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## MCP Resources Reviewed and Applied
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All currently available resources on `john-stream-mcp` were reviewed. Step 5 applies the following guidance directly:
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1. `resource://skills/pydantic-settings/document`
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- typed security-related runtime settings
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- explicit env/source precedence
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- fail-fast handling for missing/invalid required values
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2. `resource://skills/fastapi-uv-docker/document`
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- environment and deployment safety defaults
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- startup/health posture and container hygiene assumptions
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- local secret handling expectations
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3. `resource://skills/pytesting/document`
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- deterministic security-behavior test lanes
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- marker discipline and behavior-first assertions
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4. `resource://skills/python-logging-dictconfig/document`
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- centralized logging discipline
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- avoid leaking sensitive values in logs
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5. `resource://skills/nicegui-ui-customization/document`
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- user-safe failure messaging in UI
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- resilient interaction behavior and clear error feedback
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6. `resource://skills/ruff-linting-formating/document`
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- keep lint quality baseline stable during safety changes
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Planning methodology input:
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7. `resource://prompts/greenfield-architecture/document`
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- explicit tradeoff-oriented staging
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- scope discipline for minimally sufficient security controls
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Reviewed but not directly Step 5 execution-critical:
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- skills: `copilot-customization`, `fastapi-async-sqlalchemy-modernization`, `mcp-details`, `nicegui`, `python-typing`, `vscode-configuration`, `zensical-docs`
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- prompts: `authoring`, `mcp-consumer-repo-shim`, `pytest-scaffold`, `pytest-fill-scaffold`
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---
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## Current-State Gap Summary (Step 5 Scope)
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Based on current implementation and prior Step outputs:
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1. **Private-network assumptions are implicit, not fully codified**
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- Need explicit, documented security posture and operator constraints.
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2. **Access control for UI/API is minimal or absent**
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- Step 5 requires basic single-operator gating appropriate for private-network use.
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3. **Input validation baseline exists but needs security-oriented audit closure**
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- Upload and API validation should be verified for abuse-resistant boundaries.
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4. **Safe error output baseline exists (Step 2), but needs security confirmation pass**
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- Must ensure no sensitive internals leak through API/UI error payloads.
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5. **Secret handling documentation needs formalization in Step 5 artifacts**
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- Local workflow should clearly prohibit secrets in repo-tracked files and logs.
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6. **Dependency/security scanning is not yet formalized as a recurring gate**
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- Step 5 requires lightweight scanning and triage of high-risk findings.
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---
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## Scope for Step 5
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### In scope
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1. Codify private-network and single-operator security assumptions in docs and config.
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2. Add basic access control for UI/API actions (right-sized for trusted network model).
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3. Audit and harden input-validation boundaries (upload, API params/payloads, operational flags).
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4. Verify safe error surface behavior (UI/API) and prevent sensitive leak paths.
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5. Formalize local secret handling policy and usage examples.
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6. Add lightweight dependency/security scan workflow and triage policy.
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7. Add Step 5 verification tests and results artifact.
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### Out of scope
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- Internet-facing zero-trust security architecture
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- Enterprise IAM/SSO/role systems
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- Full cryptographic key-management infrastructure
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- Major security product integrations beyond lightweight V1 needs
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---
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## Target Decisions for Step 5
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1. **Threat model is explicitly private-network + single operator**
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- Security controls are right-sized to this posture and documented as assumptions.
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2. **Access control is required, even in private network mode**
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- Basic gate (single shared operator credential/token) protects UI/API mutation paths.
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3. **Validation and output safety are strict defaults**
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- Reject invalid inputs early; never expose sensitive internals in user-facing outputs.
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4. **Secrets are runtime-only**
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- No secrets committed to source control; no plaintext secret logging.
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5. **Security scanning is lightweight but mandatory**
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- Add recurring dependency/security checks with high-risk triage and closure workflow.
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6. **No security control may violate Step 1–4 operational simplicity guardrails**
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- Preserve deployability and maintainability for personal-scale use.
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---
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## Detailed Work Breakdown
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## Phase A — Security Posture Definition and Gap Lock
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- [ ] **A1. Define Step 5 threat model**
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- trusted private network
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- single operator
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- local deployment assumptions
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- explicit out-of-scope threat classes
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- [ ] **A2. Produce security baseline checklist**
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- access control
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- validation boundaries
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- safe error behavior
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- secret handling
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- dependency risk checks
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- [ ] **A3. Map controls to architecture boundaries**
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- UI
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- API
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- service
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- config/runtime
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- operator runbooks
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### Deliverables
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- `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-security-assumptions.md` (recommended)
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- Step 5 control matrix (control -> owner -> validation method)
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### Exit Criteria
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- private-network safety posture is explicit and approved
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- each in-scope control has boundary ownership and verification path
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---
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## Phase B — Basic Single-Operator Access Control
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- [ ] **B1. Select access mechanism**
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- minimal approach suitable for private-network model
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- explicitly document tradeoffs and operator ergonomics
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- [ ] **B2. Protect mutating operations first**
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- upload/create/accept/export-trigger endpoints
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- UI actions that trigger persistence changes
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- [ ] **B3. Protect read operations as policy requires**
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- determine read-path gating expectations and apply consistently
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- [ ] **B4. Add clear unauthorized behavior contract**
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- stable API status and safe message
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- UI feedback with actionable operator guidance
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### Deliverables
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- access-control policy and implementation notes
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- unauthorized behavior matrix (UI/API)
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### Exit Criteria
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- unauthorized actions are blocked consistently
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- authorized operator flows remain usable and deterministic
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---
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## Phase C — Input Validation and Safe Output Hardening
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- [ ] **C1. Validation audit for all entry points**
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- file uploads (type/size/content guards)
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- route/query/body constraints
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- service-layer invariants
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- [ ] **C2. Normalize validation failures to canonical taxonomy**
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- `validation_error` vs `user_input_error` consistency
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- [ ] **C3. Confirm safe error output policy under security lens**
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- no stack traces/secrets/internal paths in UI/API default outputs
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- preserve error reference IDs for traceability
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- [ ] **C4. Add abuse-resistant guardrails where practical**
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- basic request-size and payload-shape constraints
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- anti-duplication interaction safeguards (where missing)
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### Deliverables
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- validation-path inventory and hardening checklist
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- safe-output verification notes
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### Exit Criteria
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- input boundaries are deterministic and tested
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- user-facing error outputs remain safe and actionable
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---
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## Phase D — Secrets Handling and Configuration Safety
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- [ ] **D1. Define secret handling policy**
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- where secrets are allowed (runtime env only)
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- where secrets are prohibited (source files, docs examples beyond placeholders)
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- [ ] **D2. Enforce settings expectations**
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- required secret fields fail fast
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- avoid fallback defaults that silently weaken safety
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- [ ] **D3. Add operator documentation for local secret workflow**
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- how to set environment values safely
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- how to rotate/update credentials locally
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- [ ] **D4. Validate logging does not leak secret values**
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- startup/config logs
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- error logs for provider/config failures
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### Deliverables
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- secret-handling section in runbook/README/docs
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- settings and logging safety verification notes
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### Exit Criteria
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- no secret leakage paths remain in normal operations
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- operator can configure secrets safely using docs only
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---
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## Phase E — Dependency and Security Scanning Baseline
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- [ ] **E1. Select lightweight scanning commands for V1**
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- dependency vulnerability scan
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- optional static security scan if practical
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- [ ] **E2. Define triage policy for findings**
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- severity classification
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- required closure criteria for Step 5 completion
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- [ ] **E3. Run scans and capture evidence**
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- record command outputs/summaries
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- remediate or formally defer with risk notes
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- [ ] **E4. Add recurring execution guidance**
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- local pre-release checklist integration
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- future CI gate handoff for Step 7/9
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### Deliverables
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- Step 5 scan report artifact (recommended)
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- triage log of resolved/deferred findings
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### Exit Criteria
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- no unresolved critical vulnerabilities in Step 5 scope
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- high-risk findings are resolved or explicitly risk-accepted with rationale
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---
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## Phase F — Verification and Test Expansion
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Apply `pytesting` guidance (deterministic, behavior-first, strict markers).
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- [ ] **F1. Access-control tests**
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- unauthorized requests are rejected as expected
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- authorized operator requests succeed
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- [ ] **F2. Validation and abuse-boundary tests**
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- invalid payloads rejected with stable category/status
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- file-type/size constraints enforced
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- [ ] **F3. Safe-output tests**
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- API/UI error responses avoid sensitive details
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- error IDs and suggestions remain present
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- [ ] **F4. Config/secret safety tests**
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- required secrets fail fast when missing
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- no unsafe fallback behavior introduced
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### Validation Commands
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- `uv run pytest --collect-only -q`
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- `uv run pytest -m unit -q`
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- `uv run pytest -m "not external" -q`
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- `uv run pytest -q`
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### Exit Criteria
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- Step 5 safety behavior is test-covered and passing
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- no regression in core upload/transcribe/review workflows
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---
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## Phase G — Documentation and Risk Closure
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- [ ] **G1. Create Step 5 results artifact**
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- `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-results.md`
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- [ ] **G2. Update operator-facing docs**
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- security assumptions and local deployment cautions
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- credential handling and recovery basics
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- [ ] **G3. Update traceability and carry-forward notes**
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- map Step 5 controls to REQ and evidence
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### Deliverables
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|
||||
- `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-results.md`
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- updated security assumptions checklist and risk summary
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### Exit Criteria
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|
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- Step 5 controls and residual risks are fully documented
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- handoff is ready for Step 6 observability and Step 7 quality gates
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---
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## Recommended Implementation Order
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1. Phase A — posture definition and gap lock
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2. Phase B — access control baseline
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3. Phase C — validation/output hardening
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4. Phase D — secrets and config safety
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5. Phase E — dependency/security scan baseline
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6. Phase F — test expansion and verification
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7. Phase G — docs and risk closure
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This order reduces risk by locking assumptions first, then applying controls at highest-impact boundaries before final verification and documentation.
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---
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## Step 5 Execution Checklist (Phase-by-Phase)
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Use this checklist to execute Step 5 in implementation order and record progress/evidence.
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### Phase A — Security Posture Definition and Gap Lock
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- [ ] Publish `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-security-assumptions.md`.
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- [ ] Record explicit in-scope and out-of-scope threat classes.
|
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- [ ] Produce Step 5 control matrix (control, owner, validation method).
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- [ ] Confirm boundary ownership for each control (UI/API/service/config/docs).
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### Phase B — Basic Single-Operator Access Control
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- [ ] Choose and document access mechanism (with rationale and tradeoffs).
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- [ ] Implement enforcement for mutating API operations.
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- [ ] Implement corresponding UI-side access behavior for protected actions.
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- [ ] Decide and enforce read-path protection policy.
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- [ ] Add unauthorized API/UI contract tests.
|
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|
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### Phase C — Input Validation and Safe Output Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Complete input-validation inventory for upload/API/service boundaries.
|
||||
- [ ] Tighten payload/file constraints where gaps are found.
|
||||
- [ ] Ensure validation failure categories match `docs/error_handling.md`.
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- [ ] Verify user-facing errors remain safe, actionable, and traceable.
|
||||
- [ ] Add regression tests for invalid/boundary inputs.
|
||||
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### Phase D — Secrets Handling and Configuration Safety
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||||
|
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- [ ] Document secrets policy (runtime-only, no repo storage).
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- [ ] Verify required secret settings fail fast when missing.
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- [ ] Audit logs for accidental secret leakage risk paths.
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||||
- [ ] Update operator docs for local secret setup/rotation workflow.
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- [ ] Add tests for config safety expectations where practical.
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||||
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||||
### Phase E — Dependency and Security Scanning Baseline
|
||||
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||||
- [ ] Select scanning commands and record tool versions.
|
||||
- [ ] Run baseline scans and capture outputs.
|
||||
- [ ] Triage findings by severity and exploitability in private-network context.
|
||||
- [ ] Resolve/mitigate critical findings; document accepted residual risk.
|
||||
- [ ] Add recurring scan guidance for release workflow handoff.
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||||
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||||
### Phase F — Verification and Test Expansion
|
||||
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||||
- [ ] Run `uv run pytest --collect-only -q`.
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||||
- [ ] Run `uv run pytest -m unit -q`.
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||||
- [ ] Run `uv run pytest -m "not external" -q`.
|
||||
- [ ] Run `uv run pytest -q`.
|
||||
- [ ] Confirm no regressions in upload/transcribe/review core flows.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase G — Documentation and Risk Closure
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Complete `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-results.md` with evidence.
|
||||
- [ ] Update docs/README/runbooks with final Step 5 security posture.
|
||||
- [ ] Record REQ traceability updates and residual risks.
|
||||
- [ ] Confirm Step 5 completion checklist items are all closed.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks and Mitigations
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Risk:** Over-engineering beyond private-network needs
|
||||
- **Mitigation:** enforce Step 5 scope discipline and threat-model constraints.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Risk:** Access controls disrupt operator usability
|
||||
- **Mitigation:** keep mechanism minimal and test primary workflows thoroughly.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Risk:** Sensitive details leak through errors/logging
|
||||
- **Mitigation:** apply safe-output and log-sanitization checks with tests.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Risk:** Unpatched dependency vulnerabilities remain invisible
|
||||
- **Mitigation:** formalize scan + triage + evidence capture workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Risk:** Secret handling remains ad hoc
|
||||
- **Mitigation:** fail-fast settings + explicit operator documentation + review checks.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Step 5 Completion Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Private-network and single-operator security assumptions are documented.
|
||||
- [ ] Basic single-operator access control is implemented and verified.
|
||||
- [ ] Input-validation boundaries are audited, hardened, and test-covered.
|
||||
- [ ] UI/API error output safety is confirmed under security tests.
|
||||
- [ ] Secret handling policy and local workflow docs are complete.
|
||||
- [ ] Dependency/security scans are run; critical findings are resolved.
|
||||
- [ ] Step 5 tests pass across all validation lanes.
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/ver1/ver1-step5-results.md` is completed with evidence and residual risks.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Handoff to Step 6
|
||||
|
||||
Step 5 completion enables Step 6 (Minimal Observability & Operability) with:
|
||||
|
||||
- explicit security assumptions for operator context
|
||||
- access and validation controls suitable for private-network operation
|
||||
- safer runtime/configuration handling for ongoing operations
|
||||
- dependency-risk visibility feeding release-readiness gates
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user